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Window Dressing? The Mainstreaming Strategy of the Rassemblement 
National in Power at the Local Level of Government   
Populist radical right (PRR) parties have increasingly occupied positions of 
power in recent years, inspiring much scholarly interest in the mainstreaming 
consequences of government responsibility. This article analyses the extent and 
manner of mainstreaming of the Rassemblement National (RN) while in power at 
the local level of government in France. A municipal level focus enables the 
novel inclusion of the party into the debate regarding the consequences of 
government participation for the PRR. We conduct a paired case study analysis 
of RN-led Hénin-Beaumont, the political base of Marine Le Pen and her ‘de-
demonisation’ strategy, alongside nearby, mainstream party-led Lens. We 
analyse the policy and discourse of the administration through a qualitative 
content analysis of mayoral statements and data from semi-structured interviews 
with local politicians. The results show a partial mainstreaming due to the 
strategic exercise of local government power to present a more moderate and 
capable image, as well as the use of populist discourse to frame mainstream 
opposition forces and the local press as working against the interests of ‘the 
people’.  
Keywords: radical right; populism; mainstreaming; Rassemblement National, 
Front National, France 
 
In 2007, Marine Le Pen chose Hénin-Beaumont, a former mining town in the far north 
of France, as her political base. That year she stood as a candidate there for the 
legislative elections and over the following decade the town became a symbol of her 
leadership and electoral success. Since taking over the reins of the Rassemblement 
National (RN) in 2011, formerly known as the Front National, a key strategy has been 
that of dédiabolisation or ‘de-demonisation’.1 This is the process by which Le Pen and 
colleagues have sought to construct a newly mainstream political image with broadened 
appeal.2 In 2014, the RN gained control of the local government of Hénin-Beaumont. 
According to Le Pen and the incoming mayor, Steeve Briois, the town was to be used as 
the vitrine, a showcase or shop window, to demonstrate a ‘cleaned up’ image of the 
central party as ‘normal’.3  
Existing research is conflicted over the extent to which populist radical right 
(PRR) parties like the RN retain and implement their ideology when in government or 
are ‘tamed’ by the experience (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015: 9-10). This article 
analyses the exercise of power of the RN at the local level of government in Hénin-
Beaumont and the extent and manner of mainstreaming. A municipal level focus 
enables the novel inclusion of the contemporary RN into this debate, usually absent due 
to their lack of governing experience at either the national or regional level, and an 
investigation of the mainstreaming process in local government which has been 
neglected in the literature. Although sub-national arenas are often assumed to play a 
role in the mainstreaming process of radical parties, analysis of this process is hitherto 
lacking. 
The importance placed on their control of Hénin-Beaumont (and other towns) as 
part of the strategy of dédiabolisation has not yet received detailed academic attention. 
Analysis of the particular sub-national approach of the RN demands a change in 
perspective from national level analyses of mainstreaming. Rather than the usual 
consideration of policy-seeking radical parties, constrained and to some extent 
moderated by the transition to government, we instead focus upon the RN’s strategic 
use of local government office to project an image of moderation. This article thus asks 
the following research question: To what extent is mainstreaming of the RN evident in 
their leadership of the local government of Hénin-Beaumont? 
To answer this question, we analyse the discourse of the RN elected officials in 
the local government of Hénin-Beaumont, drawing from mayoral statements, semi-
structured interviews with local politicians and journalists, and local press coverage 
over a five year period. We analyse, firstly, the salience of different issues in their 
policy outputs and their framing, and, secondly, their framing of antagonistic political 
relations. We find a partial mainstreaming of the RN in the position of local government 
leadership has indeed occurred, in accordance with some, but not all, of our theoretical 
expectations. Yet we argue their actions follow from a strategic aim to showcase their 
competence in (local) government participation, rather than moderation as a simple 
result of the (often mundane) responsibilities of the role of mayor. 
Mainstreaming of the Populist Radical Right in Power 
Moderation of radical parties through democratic participation 
The RN is an archetypal example of the populist radical right. Members of this party 
family share the core ideological traits of authoritarianism, nativism and populism, and 
hold radical positions on related policy issues which distinguish them from the 
mainstream (Mudde 2007). Such radical parties are commonly expected to moderate as 
a result of their institutional adaptation to democratic participation. ‘Inclusion-
moderation’ theories offer a number of routes by which this can take place. First, 
according to the Downsian logic of the median-voter theorem, parties may relinquish 
their more radical goals due to the pressure of electoral participation and the 
prioritisation of vote-maximising and office-seeking strategies (Downs 1957; Downs et 
al. 2009). Second, electoral campaigns and policy development require 
professionalization of their organisation, resulting in the promotion of pragmatists over 
radical firebrands (Michels 1968). Radical parties that go on to attain positions of 
government responsibility are expected to moderate through several additional 
mechanisms. Third, when a coalition with a mainstream party is required, adjustments 
of radical positions are likely to be demanded in the negotiation process and throughout 
the governing period (Dunphy and Bale 2011). Fourth, the demands of administration 
lead to a shift in attention from ideological radicalism towards practical policy delivery: 
the so-called ‘pothole theory’ of democracy (Berman 2008: 6).  
However, many populist parties have managed to maintain their radical stance 
when in office, achieve policy victories, and even profit electorally from the experience 
(Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015). Whether moderation of these parties in office also 
takes place at the local level of government has not hitherto been addressed. The sub-
national arena has been assumed to be a location through which mainstreaming takes 
place, without investigation of the specific mechanisms (Akkerman et al. 2016: 21; 
Kitschelt 2007: 1190). Crucially, in order to assess the radicalism of a local 
administration through their actions in office, recent studies have shown that partisan 
influence is also possible at this level of government (Paxton 2019; Weisskircher 2019).  
An analysis of the RN in local government therefore enables us to study a key PRR 
party that previously had next to no experience of government responsibility, in a 
context where they are also unconstrained by coalition dynamics.  
Dimensions of the mainstreaming of radical parties 
Mainstreaming - here analysed in the sense of radical parties changing to become more 
like mainstream parties and not the opposite process (see Van Spanje 2010) - can take 
place in a number of ways. First, in terms of de-radicalisation of positions taken on their 
core issues. The positions of the PRR regarding sociocultural issues central to their 
ideology – primarily immigration, European integration and law and order – are usually 
far from those of mainstream parties. Second, in terms of an expansion of their 
programmes beyond certain niches. For the populist radical right, this niche has 
traditionally centred on the aforementioned sociocultural issues with a lack of 
corresponding emphasis on socioeconomic issues (Mudde 2007). Third, a softening of 
anti-establishment positions. Populism, from which anti-establishment positions stem, is 
here defined as: ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and 
which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) 
of the people’ (Mudde 2004: 543). The populism of these parties manifests itself in a 
style of discourse which expresses those ideas (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013), as 
well as actions that represent a refusal to abide by the formal and informal ‘rules of the 
game’ (Abedi 2004), whereas mainstreaming results in less populist content in 
discourse and action.  Fourth, their organisational competence and perceived fitness to 
govern may increase helping to surmount the concerns of some voters that radical, niche 
and populist parties are not legitimate to hold government responsibility. A reputation 
of incompetence in the role has proved an obstacle to further electoral success (Fallend 
and Heinisch 2016; Heinisch 2003; Luther 2011).  These four dimensions of 
mainstreaming – de-radicalisation of issue positions, expansion of programmes, 
softening of anti-establishment positions, and an increase in focus on their competence 
– therefore provide the grounding for a number of expectations, which the following 
section will outline for the specific case of the RN in local government. 
Expectations of the local Rassemblement National mainstreaming strategy  
There can be no doubt that under the influence of the leadership of Marine Le Pen since 
2011, the RN has sought to portray itself as a more mainstream party and overcome its 
reputation for racism and extremism (Crépon 2012). An impressive rise in electoral 
support also demonstrates a significant degree of mainstreaming in the perception of the 
electorate (Mayer 2018: 12). Despite eventual defeat in the second round of the 2017 
Presidential Election, Marine Le Pen managed to secure more than 10 million votes, 
which represents one third of those who voted.4 Sub-national politics also seem to 
reveal a wider acceptance of the RN: the 2014 municipal elections represented a 
significant breakthrough, with an unprecedented eleven mayors elected.   
 Several barriers to the RN being perceived as a ‘normal party’ by voters remain, 
which they have sought to address in local government. The first is ideological. The RN 
continues to be seen by the majority as extreme in its xenophobia and thus a danger to 
democracy (Mayer 2018: 15). To overcome this reputation, overt racism from party 
officials has been punished more strictly and publicly, most notably in the case of the 
expulsion of Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2015. The central opposition to ‘radical Islamism’ 
and communautarisme has been increasingly framed in the name of democracy, 
secularism and the defence of minority rights. In contrast to the municipal governments 
of the RN in the 1990s that attempted to put in place the nativist ideas of ‘national 
preference’ (Davies 1999; Shields 2007), we expect the RN to downplay nativism in 
policy and discourse in the leadership of local government of Hénin-Beaumont since 
2014.  
Closely connected to the perception of radicalism is their image as a niche party, 
with a focus confined to issues of immigration and security and much less emphasis on 
crucial issues such as the economy. A much commented upon plank of the RN 
dédiabolisation strategy is a new focus upon social issues and areas negatively affected 
by globalisation (Ivaldi 2015; Shields 2014: 502–503). As a result, we expect the RN-
led local government of Hénin-Beaumont to emphasize socio-economic issues in policy 
and discourse. 
The RN has long been anti-establishment in its extreme opposition not only to 
mainstream parties but the entire political system and underlying republican values 
(Ivaldi 2016: 231). A recent innovation of Marine Le Pen is an insistence upon the RN’s 
republicanism and loyalty to the system (Shields 2014: 503).  In order for such 
mainstreaming to be evident in this dimension in Hénin-Beaumont, we should see the 
RN use less of a populist style of discourse and abide by the formal and informal ‘rules 
of the game’ of local government leadership. 
A further limitation faced by the RN which they seek to address at the local level 
of government is their lack of credibility as a party of government. Due to the French 
majoritarian electoral system and the continued cordon sanitaire imposed by the 
mainstream parties at national and regional level, the RN has been unable to gain 
experience in the same way as many other European PRR parties and in the process 
develop actual and perceived governing competence. Before 2014, the party’s 
experience of local government and institutional adaptation was limited to ‘those few 
but significant towns where it exercised municipal power (Toulon, Orange, Marignane 
and Vitrolles), [in which] it pushed the bounds of constitutionality in seeking to 
implement its programme’ (Shields 2014: 497). Indeed, these examples of the RN in 
sub-national positions of responsibility following their breakthrough in the 1995 
municipal elections were beset by tales of incompetence as well as nativist extremism in 
policy. As a result, we expect the RN leadership of the local government of Hénin-
Beaumont to emphasize their competence in the role. 
Case Selection, Data and Methods 
To investigate the use of local government leadership by RN actors as part of a strategy 
of mainstreaming, we conducted a case study analysis, paired with a mainstream party-
led case from the same region. A paired comparison within the same systemic context 
provided an analytical baseline with which to assess the distinctiveness of the RN-led 
case (Tarrow 2010: 244). We analysed their discourse to test our hypotheses derived 
from the literature on mainstreaming of populist radical right parties in general, and the 
‘de-demonisation’ strategy of the RN in particular, namely: the extent to which the RN 
de-emphasizes overt ideological (in particular, nativist) commitments and extends to 
wider (in particular socio-economic) issues in their policy focus, and the extent to which 
their discourse emphasizes anti-establishment credentials and competence, including 
through populist and technocratic frames (Caramani 2017). 
The case of Hénin-Beaumont, governed by the RN since 2014, was selected as 
one of the largest towns controlled by the party but also the most symbolic and 
important hence its status as the vitrine. Furthermore, given that the mayor, Steeve 
Briois, is also a national figure for the party, we expected an important influence of the 
national party on policy decisions. Nearby Lens, also in the Pas-de-Calais department, 
was selected for comparison: a similarly sized city that has also experienced an 
economic downturn associated with the decline of the mining industry. It is led by the 
Parti Socialiste (PS), the party that governed Hénin Beaumont alone or in coalition with 
other left parties throughout the post-war period. The discourse of the local 
governments during the period 2014-19 was analysed via a number of sources. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with twelve local government actors from both 
the governing and opposition parties in Hénin-Beaumont and Lens. Representatives 
from the governing parties were in positions of responsibility as deputy mayors 
(adjoints au maire) and opposition actors were elected as local councillors. As the 
interviews were conducted on condition of anonymity, those interviewed are not 
identified by name. The interview questions were adapted from the surveys of European 
mayors conducted by the POLLEADER network with a focus upon the governing 
process and their policy outputs (Heinelt et al. 2018). Articles from the governing 
period 2014-19 were sourced from the online archives of the most widely read local 
newspaper, La Voix du Nord, using keyword searches. Additional expert interviews 
were held with journalists based in the two towns in order to gain further insights free 
from partisan bias.  
Issue positions and salience were assessed using a qualitative content analysis of 
the local government newsletter, Hénin-Beaumont C’est Vous !. This monthly 
publication was introduced by the RN administration in order to communicate directly 
with citizens and bypass the local press, which is claimed to be opposed to them. The 
newsletter is delivered to all households in the municipality and therefore has a larger 
potential local audience than any other source. From each of the 46 newsletters coded, 
the mayoral statement was broken down into 728 core sentences as the unit of analysis. 
Data were also drawn from the monthly newsletter of the Lens administration, Lens 
Mag: mayoral statements from 45 newsletters were transformed into 670 core 
sentences.  
Similar to past applications of core sentence analysis, we code the relationship 
between ‘political objects’ in the text, between a subject (a political actor, in this case 
the mayor) and an object (either another political actor or a policy issue), along with the 
direction of the relationship between the two (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 1997).5  The 
categorisation of policy issues was based upon the framework of Kriesi et al. (2006), 
selecting from the following items: budget, local economy, culture, education, security, 
immigration, infrastructure, health, welfare, participation. In addition, the frames used 
to define a problem or justify their position were coded (up to three for each core 
sentence). Framing, to follow Entman (1993: 52) is to ‘select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as 
to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation.’ For issues, we distinguish between cultural, 
economic and other utilitarian frames, again following the work of Kriesi et al. (2006). 
Cultural frames may either be traditional-nationalist or multicultural-universalist; 
economic frames may be social security-investment oriented or free market-neoliberal 
oriented; and the utilitarian frames are those without additional ideological content. For 
actors, we coded the frames on an inductive basis in detail and then summarized them in 
a limited number of abstract categories.  
Analysis: the Rassemblement National mainstreaming strategy in Hénin-
Beaumont  
Hénin-Beaumont has long been central to the strategy of Marine Le Pen to normalize 
the party. This is evident in her choice of the town as her seat for National Assembly 
election attempts in 2007, 2012 and 2017 (in the latter case, successfully), as well as 
gaining a seat on the municipal council in 2008 and 2009. It offers advantages to the 
party due to its context: a former coal-mining town devastated by socio-economic 
problems and a difficult post-industrial transition. Hénin-Beaumont is a potent symbol 
of the ‘left behind’ of globalisation (Crépon 2012; Gougou and Mayer 2014). The 
voters in this social group are crucial to the contemporary populist radical right across 
Western Europe (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922). As well as profound socioeconomic problems, 
the RN could capitalize on localized political controversies. The corruption scandal 
involving the long governing Socialist-led administration caused it to collapse and the 
mayor Gérard Dalongeville was arrested in 2009. At that point the long-standing, but 
gradually eroding, bonds of industrial employment, class solidarity and socialist politics 
seemed truly shattered. The opportunity was opened for gains to be made by the RN, yet 
the particular context demanded adjustment of their programme.6 Core issues of 
immigration and national preference were removed from RN campaigns in Hénin-
Beaumont from 2008 onwards (Tondelier 2017: 50). The apparently moderated RN won 
the 2014 Hénin-Beaumont municipal election at the first round with 50.25% of the vote 
and Briois became mayor. Due to the size of the victory, the RN were able to govern 
alone without the need of coalition partners and the associated constraints that would be 
imposed.  
Policy: de-radicalisation of core issue positions and programmatic broadening?  
Firstly, what are the policy areas focused upon by the RN administration in Hénin-
Beaumont? To what extent and how does the party pursue its strategy of dédiabolisation 
through its policy? Our analysis draws from interviews with local government actors 
and the newsletters of the administration to reveal the relative salience of different 
policy areas and their framing. 
[Figure 1 here] 
The results illustrated in Figure 1 show the predominance of cultural policy, 
infrastructure works and financial management in the communications of the RN 
administration of Hénin-Beaumont. First, cultural policy has been made central to the 
output of the local government: it is the most salient issue, to a much greater extent than 
in Lens. According to interviews with actors from both the governing majority and 
opposition, the administration has focused strongly on collective gatherings like 
festivals and markets.7 Their approach is intended to be close to the interests of the local 
population and RN actors contrast  nearby towns run by mainstream parties whose 
cultural events are ‘pharaonic in terms of budget and of little interest to the population’.8 
Traditional symbols have been given a new emphasis in public displays during the 
Christmas season. As a result, a public nativity scene has been the focus of a symbolic 
battle between the administration and opponents (Martin 2017). Yet there is an absence 
of nativist framing of cultural policy, as was strongly in evidence in towns led by the 
party in the 1990s with ‘partisan choices over artistic events, cinema schedules and 
library holdings’ (Shields 2014: 498).  
Second, there is an emphasis on infrastructure, particularly the beautification of 
public spaces.9 These works are framed as non-ideological achievements. As a RN local 
government official states: ‘When we redo a pavement or […] a road, the pavement is 
not left, it is not right, it is not conservative, it is not liberal.’10 The most focused upon 
changes in the newsletters are renovations made to the church and town hall. These 
historic buildings have high symbolic value, recalling a prior age of prosperity and 
grandeur, as well as the more recent past of neglect. Opposition councillors were at 
pains to stress that many of these improvements, including the renovation of the church, 
had been initiated by the previous administration. Nonetheless, they found that since the 
election of the RN in 2014 ‘the average resident has the impression that the town is 
cleaner, more beautiful and has more flowers’.11   
A repeated claim by the RN administration is that it delivers such services better 
thanks to more effective financial management. Indeed, when presenting their 
budgetary policy – their third most focused upon issue – the administration emphasizes 
their financial efficiency and continual lowering of taxation. The budget is presented as 
an opportunity to ‘right the wrongs’ of the previous administration: to resolve the toxic 
loans and reduce high taxation that was needed to deal with the resulting debt. The 
focus of the economic agenda is upon the reduction of taxation: initially by 10% and 
then by an additional 5% the following year (Farel et al. 2015: 241).  They have also cut 
costs through an increase in free market solutions, in contrast to previous deals agreed 
to with favoured contractors.12 There is a lack of associated investment in social issues 
in Hénin-Beaumont alongside these cutbacks, which contrasts with the idea that the 
mariniste RN follows a leftist economic agenda (Ivaldi 2015). 
In sum, through these three policy areas the administration emphasizes 
improvements made to the day-to-day quality of life for citizens in the town in a manner 
that is visible and felt in the short-term, and contrasts with the previous administration. 
As the soon-to-be RN mayor stated prior to the 2014 elections: ‘I will not do things like 
in Vitrolles. I will leave the domain of ideology and symbols to those who have a good 
imagination. I want to give life to Hénin-Beaumont, make it a clean and healthy town 
where people are happy’.13 Similarly, a senior RN official we interviewed claimed that 
‘running a town is not about politics or ideology, it needs to be run pragmatically. One 
must be a realist when running local government’.14 As Shields (2014) suggests, the 
party has learned from the legacy of an ideology-driven approach to local government 
in the 1990s and our results show that, at least in Hénin-Beaumont, it has managed to 
distance itself from the more radical elements of its policy agenda and promote 
organisational competence. 
Much less focused upon are two core issues of the RN: security and migration. 
Despite the apparent de-radicalisation of the contemporary RN, these issues remain 
central to a national party discourse that remains solidly radical right (Ivaldi 2016: 229). 
Indeed, the two have become more closely intertwined as opposition to Islam/Muslims 
is framed as a threat to national values and linked to terrorism, rather than earlier 
notions of explicit racism. In Hénin-Beaumont, an expansion of CCTV security and 
policing are mentioned in interviews with deputy mayors. However, security policy 
barely features in the mayoral statements. Furthermore, the issue of migration had no 
core sentences whatsoever devoted to it throughout the entire period. The only 
migration related intervention is the charter issued by a number of RN mayors, 
including Briois, that opposed the reception of migrants in their towns following the 
dismantling of the migrant camp in Calais (Front National 2016).15 In sum, this suggests 
more than simply a toning down of their language regarding these issues, as has been 
attributed to the mariniste RN (Bastow 2018). Rather than de-radicalisation in the sense 
of changing their position, the issues are avoided entirely by the RN in Hénin-Beaumont 
in their communication with citizens.  
However, despite this apparent move away from a programmatic niche centred 
on nativism, the RN have not extended their programmatic focus into socio-economic 
issues as expected. Policy proposals to contend with the economic decline of the town 
were lacking from both the interviews and mayoral statements. The relative absence of 
broader socio-economic issues from the RN administration is revealed by comparison 
with nearby Lens, where issues of economic development, education, healthcare and 
social assistance are given far more attention in the mayoral statements. The opportunity 
for French local governments to generate local economic development is constrained as 
this is a responsibility of the inter-communal body (établissement public de coopération 
intercommunale - EPCI) that groups several small towns, or higher levels of 
government such as the region. The case of Lens shows, however, that various forms of 
intervention are indeed available to mayors. In contrast, socio-economic issues 
comprise another set of policy areas that are avoided by the mayor of Hénin-Beaumont 
in his communication with local citizens. 
The policy priorities of the Hénin-Beaumont local government are distinct from 
those expected from a populist radical right party such as the RN. Government action is 
instead focused upon concrete changes to the local environment, in terms of both events 
and infrastructure, as well as the budget. As the issues that characterize the RN as a 
distinctively populist radical right party (immigration and security) are lacking, this 
represents a clear moderation of their stance in substantive policy terms, although their 
issue focus remains narrow when it comes to socio-economic policies (beyond the 
budget). Furthermore, the framing of these policies is utilitarian, similar to the 
administration in Lens; there is no evidence of a distinctively ideological framing, in 
either a cultural or economic sense.  
Discourse and Style: populist and technocratic? 
How are local political relations spoken about by the RN administration? How do they 
envisage the ideal representative model? This section considers how the RN local 
government actors construct local political relations through the framing of local 
citizens, the administration and the opposition.  
[Figure 2 here] 
The results shown in figure 2 demonstrate, firstly, ‘the people’ are not a particularly 
salient topic. This is surprising for a party very well established to be populist. 
According to the ideological definition followed here, people-centrism is a core 
component. Local citizens are the subject of much less attention than the administration 
itself and its opposition. Yet, despite the relative scarcity of attention given, the idea of 
the ‘pure’ people – central to the ideological definition of populism – is evident in the 
framing of local citizens in terms of dignity, honour and authenticity. 
In contrast to [local journalist] Pascal Wallart, who claims that many people in our 
town ‘no longer have a political conscience’, I think you are pioneers in 
reappropriating everyday life, reality and the common interest: that's one of the 
reasons I'm so proud to be your mayor! The dignity and honour of the inhabitants 
of our town, ridiculed by politicians and the media, are values I want to pay 
homage to, and which deserve to be defended.16 
The most common framing of ‘the people’ is in terms of their contribution and 
productivity in efforts to improve the town, for instance: ‘the Heninois and Beaumontois 
invest great enthusiasm in all municipal projects’.17  Furthermore, the populist 
conception of a homogeneous citizenry is revealed in an interview with an RN local 
government official: ‘I do not like talking in terms of communities, because in the 
French spirit, there are no communities, there is a French people, there are no divisions 
in the French people’.18  In this celebration and homogenization of the locality and its 
population, the concept of ‘the heartland’ is relevant: ‘an idealized conception of the 
community they serve, [from which] populists construct the ‘people’ as the object of 
their politics (Taggart 2004: 274). The homogeneity of the citizenry is also a classic 
trope of the neo-republicanism that is espoused by parties across the political spectrum 
in France and thus indicates another form of mainstreaming (Chabal 2015). 
The most referenced actor in the Hénin-Beaumont newsletters is the RN 
administration itself. The most common framing is in terms of their responsiveness to 
the demands of the citizens and their dedication towards their activity and efficacy in 
outcomes (see figure 3). Interviews with leading opposition figures reveal an 
acknowledgement of the ‘professional’ style of RN elected officials despite opposition 
to their aims.19 The quality of their organisation is helped by the seniority of figures 
involved in the town hall who are currently serving (or have recently served) as an 
MEP, Deputy of the National Assembly, regional councillor and departmental 
councillor. Yet, rather than a technocratic emphasis on expertise, the mayoral 
statements stress their commitment to being close and responsive to local interests.  
[Figure 3 here] 
The primary targets of the RN administration – those actors who were most often 
mentioned negatively in interviews and coded with a negative position in the mayoral 
statements – are opposition political actors. They are portrayed negatively in terms of 
their performance above all, with the use of frames of ineffectiveness (see figure 4). 
Ideological antagonism is also expressed by the RN through framing of their supposed 
hostility to local interests and disconnection from traditional culture. Furthermore, the 
opposition are represented as overly critical and consequently obstructing the RN 
administration from getting things done: ‘an opposition that only knows how to criticize 
what appeals to the inhabitants of our town’.20 This latter point is mirrored somewhat in 
the case of Lens: the administration similarly frames their (RN) opposition as 
unproductively critical. However, the PS mayor of Lens takes a distinctive stance 
against their ‘irresponsibility’ which he juxtaposes with his own ‘responsibility’ (a 
much more frequently employed self-framing by the Lens mayor – see figure 2), which 
is typical of mainstream party ‘anti-populism’ (Moffitt 2018: 6).   
How can we attribute any credibility to those [from the RN] who confuse running a 
town and a flea market, for whom the art of making promises and telling voters 
what they want to hear is actually the art of trying to dupe the Lensois? No, 
frankly, they are visibly lacking in seriousness and competence in their hostile 
crusade. And their excesses and outbursts, sometimes aimed at me or some of my 
deputies, render their attacks ludicrously inappropriate or simply pointless.21    
Another target of the RN administration is the press. The local newspaper, La Voix du 
Nord, has been vociferously targeted. The conflict between the paper and the 
administration was focused upon in all interviews and was present in the newsletters. As 
revealed in interviews with senior RN administration figures, the rift was truly opened 
up during the campaign prior to the 2015 regional elections when the newspaper, which 
effectively holds a monopoly in the town, strongly opposed the party (La Voix du Nord 
2015a; La Voix du Nord 2015b).22 In the newsletters of the administration, the paper is 
framed as culturally disconnected from the town: disrespectful to local citizens, 
frivolous in their favoured issues, and polemical in their constant opposition to the RN 
administration.   
They attack me because I defend you. Since 2014, our administration has been the 
target of all types of attacks: lies, defamation, invasion of privacy, jeopardizing of 
municipal projects, threats, judicial persecution, and so on. The self-righteous and 
the media are always less scrupulous when it comes to attacking the [national] 
governing majority. Against us anything, even the very worst [criticism], is 
allowed.23   
There is a notable lack of reference to the non-‘native’, migrant figure as the ‘other’ by 
the RN in both interviews and mayoral statements. Even local opposition actors admit 
that relations between the local mosque and the RN administration are positive 
(Tondelier 2017: 69). Similar to the avoidance of policy issues that resonate with 
traditional RN nativism, social groups that would be excluded according to nativist 
ideology are similarly avoided in the discourse of the RN administration. Muslims are 
mentioned just once in the mayoral statements, to justify their Christmas public 
celebrations – ‘whether one is Catholic, Jewish, Muslim or atheist, one can admire the 
beauty and innocence of a nativity scene without seeing it as an attack on someone’s 
beliefs’24 – and radical Islamism also only once, in response to the 2015 terrorism 
attacks. To label such discourse as nativism would be an excessive stretch of the 
concept. The antagonism constructed by the RN in Hénin-Beaumont is instead focused 
on formal local political relations.  
[Figure 4 here] 
Discussion  
How do we explain this approach taken by the RN in Hénin-Beaumont? The 
predominant and, in comparison with a mainstream-led case, distinctive features of their 
administration are a policy focus upon cultural events and budgetary stability (without 
the usual nativism, yet neither with greater socio-economic breadth), along with a 
discursive focus on their own competence and responsiveness to public opinion in 
opposition to politicized obstruction from the previously governing centre-left and local 
media. The strategic emphasis is on the projection of an image of competence in 
government and closeness to citizens. This is intended to help mainstream the party in 
the eyes of the electorate. As one official confided ‘the way we have run the town has 
helped to de-demonize the RN, no doubt about it’.25  
Can the approach of the RN administration be characterized as populist? The 
mariniste RN has been reported to have pursued a ‘discursive shift [that] involved a 
more developed populism’ (Bastow 2018: 23). The complaint made by RN actors in 
Hénin-Beaumont is that the town was neglected by the preceding local government, and 
their claim in response is one of action and thence visible improvements to daily life. 
The differences expressed in the newsletters between the current RN government and 
their predecessors are not primarily ideological in nature but of effort and achievement: 
a feature of valence politics. Yet, the representation of a positive and pure citizenry, 
whose interests the administration is uniquely able to represent, can certainly be 
characterized as populist. Furthermore, the behaviour of the RN in Hénin-Beaumont has 
demonstrated an anti-establishment logic in challenging the ‘rules of the game’. The 
results show a highly conflictual political environment since the RN have been in office. 
The council meetings have been particularly confrontational, with personal attacks on 
opposition politicians both during the meetings and subsequently on social media.26 
Furthermore, the opposition have been frustrated by the lack of prior communication 
regarding the scheduling of these meetings. The administration has prioritized control: a 
further example illustrated by reports of an increase in surveillance over political 
statements made by municipal staff on social media, in order to prevent continuing links 
between the town hall and the parties in opposition since 2014 (Tondelier 2017).  
A technocratic governing approach can be used to signal moderation and 
competence. While some have considered the concepts of populism and technocracy as 
antithetical to each other (Laclau, 2005; Muller 2016), other recent works conceive 
them to be 'unlikely allies' (Bickerton and Accetti 2018; Caramani 2017). Above all, 
both are united in their opposition to (representative) politics, pluralism and 
bureaucracy. Furthermore, technocracy and populism are particularly well matched at 
the local level of government due to its typically less party-political character, as well as 
the more common demand for problem resolution in non-ideological fields. 
Investigation of whether such technocratic-populism is also reflected in the populist 
radical right has not hitherto been carried out (Bickerton and Accetti 2018: 145). We 
find the discourse of the RN in Hénin-Beaumont does focus upon its apolitical 
performance, yet lacks the defining characteristic of technocracy as an apolitical focus 
on resolution of individual demands by experts (Fischer, 1990). Instead, they emphasize 
their dedication, responsiveness and proximity to local interests. 
Conclusion 
The mainstreaming of radical parties as a result of government participation has, up 
until now, neglected a subnational perspective. As a result, the RN have been excluded 
from the discussion, due to their absence from national and regional power. This article 
has shifted perspective to the municipal level of government and shown how the RN in 
leadership of the local government of Hénin-Beaumont is de-radicalized, not only in 
historic comparison to the Jean-Marie Le Pen era of the party, but even to the national 
level in the current phase of dédiabolisation. Various scholars of the RN have disputed 
the extent to which the party has truly undergone moderation in substance rather than 
appearance, and in which aspects – rhetoric, policies and reputation (Ivaldi 2016; Surel 
2019). Indeed, the continuing populism in discourse and style remains in evidence, as 
the party seeks to break the old consensus and form a new local hegemony. We argue 
that this is a case of strategic mainstreaming in pursuit of respectability and a display of 
competence rather than moderation imposed upon the party by the responsibilities of 
governing, as the ‘pothole theory’ would suggest.  
The responsibilities of government have certainly not damaged the electoral scores of 
the party in Hénin-Beaumont. In the 2015 regional elections, the town voted massively 
for the RN, in some wards up to 72% (Tondelier 2017: 8), and the results of the 2017 
presidential and legislative elections also showed increased support for the party in the 
town compared to 2012, as well as to the national rate of increase. We therefore 
emphasize the agency of sub-national political actors to implement distinctive strategies 
and attain atypical levels of electoral success, as argued elsewhere with radical left 
parties (Weisskircher 2017: 4). 
 
The strategy of mainstreaming by radical right parties is a risky one with which 
populism can help. To moderate ‘too far’, in pursuit of shedding the image of racism 
and attaining one of mainstream credibility, risks losing their core support (Adams et al. 
2006; Dézé 2015; Ivaldi 2016). This risk is particularly high when these parties enter 
government positions, due to the need for compromises on top of the strain of 
responsibility. Populist ideology and communication strategies facilitate a strategic 
moderation, including when in power; for example, the 'one foot in, one foot out' 
strategy of the Lega Nord (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005). In this way, populism is 
far from incompatible with power as was the dominant conception in the past (Canovan 
1999; Mény and Surel 2002; Taggart 2004: 284) but in fact can contribute to building 
support in government as well as in opposition. Our study shows this compatibility at 
the local level of government: here the RN have presented themselves as the true 
representatives of ‘the people’ and their opponents as an elite opposed to their interests, 
in place of a nativist emphasis upon ethnically defined outgroups.  
 
This study opens three main avenues for future research, beyond the focus of this case 
study. First, our article suggests an understudied variable for research into the sub-
national roots of the electoral rise of radical right parties: their actions in (specific, 
heavily mediatized) local government cases. Future studies could inquire into the extent 
to which the RN mainstreaming strategy executed in the governance of Hénin-
Beaumont resonates more widely in France. After all, their rhetoric of local government 
as a vitrine implies that the showcase will be visible and influential beyond the 
municipality itself. Second, future comparative studies could investigate the influence 
of institutional factors for the local mainstreaming strategies of populist radical right 
parties. Existing research shows the radicalism of these parties’ pursuit of a populist 
democratic agenda varies according to the level of local government autonomy (Paxton 
2019). Do populist radical right parties in countries with higher levels of subnational 
autonomy than France display greater independence from their central party office and 
implement more ideological policy? We could expect particularly strong evidence of a 
multi-level mainstreaming strategy in France due to the centralised party structure of the 
RN, as well as well-established culture of cumul des mandats. Third, regarding the 
extent of within-national variation of governing strategies by the populist radical right. 
Are these findings from the RN in Henin-Beaumont replicated in other municipalities 
governed by the party? Hénin-Beaumont has received more attention from Marine Le 
Pen and the party than any other municipality, which may lead to distinctive results. 
Furthermore, there are stark differences in the electorate of the RN between the north 
and south of the country, and varied strategic approaches taken by the party in different 
regions as a result (Ivaldi and Dutozia 2018). Future research should therefore consider 
the within-national variation of the approach to local government of the RN, and other 
radical right parties, to assess the extent and manner to which the vitrine of local 
government changes as the audience varies – in terms of their expression of both the 
‘host’ radical right ideology and the ‘thin’ populist ideology.  
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 1 The name of the party was changed from Front National (FN) to Rassemblement National 
(RN) in June 2018. This article uses the current name except when referred to in documents 
or quotes about the party prior to that date. 
2 The term dédiabolisation was coined by the then FN at the end of the 1980s. While attempts to 
normalise the party are therefore nothing new, in the media and popular imagination the term 
has come to represent the changes made, and intensely emphasised, by Marine Le Pen since 
becoming leader in 2011 (Dézé 2015). 
3 ‘Politics is about selling an ideal […] we need to clean up our image and prove to people that 
the central party is normal. If we win the town hall [in Hénin-Beaumont] this town will be 
the vitrine’ (Briois quoted in Sabéran 2014: 21–22). 
4 In Hénin-Beaumont, Marine Le Pen received 62% of the vote in the second round of the 2017 
Presidential election and in the subsequent legislative election was elected as deputy for the 
constituency which includes Hénin-Beaumont with 59% of the vote. Source: 
https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections 
5 While the core sentence analysis method is more commonly used to analyse party competition 
and therefore seeks to reconstruct the political space through positions held by multiple 
parties, in this article we take a limited focus solely upon the party in government in order to 
provide qualitative detail on the case study. 
6 A typically populist radical right agenda of anti-establishment ethnic solidarity was initially 
followed by the central figure of RN politics in Hénin-Beaumont since the 1990s, Steeve 
Briois. He and future president of the council majority Bruno Bilde followed the 
modernizing breakaway faction of Bruno Megret in 1998 and have, in recent years, been 
central figures in Marine Le Pen’s changing party (Shields 2014: 499). 
                                                 
                                                                                                                                               
7 Almeida (2019: 274) notes that ‘since 2014, the towns governed by the FN have witnessed a 
rapid proliferation of public festivals staging ‘traditional’ culture. Among these new events, 
there appears to be a particular preference for medieval re-enactment festivals.’ 
8 Interview with RN deputy mayor, Hénin-Beaumont. 
9 Interview with opposition councillor, Hénin-Beaumont. 
10 Interview with RN deputy mayor, Hénin-Beaumont. 
11 Interview with opposition councillor, Hénin-Beaumont. 
12 Interview with RN deputy mayor, Hénin-Beaumont. 
13 Steeve Briois quoted in Sabéran (2014: 208). It was in the town of Vitrolles, led by Catherine 
Mégret after a by-election victory in 1997, where the policy of 'national preference' was 
pursued most vigorously. Notoriously this included a policy of rewarding parents of 
newborn babies with 5000 francs, on condition that they were French or European (later 
declared illegal by the courts). 
14 Interview with RN deputy mayor, Hénin-Beaumont. 
15 This decision was described as ‘one of the few political decisions that we have made’ 
(Interview with RN deputy mayor, Hénin-Beaumont).  
16 Hénin-Beaumont C’est Vous !, February 2016. 
17 Hénin-Beaumont C’est Vous !, May 2015. 
18 Interview with RN deputy mayor, Hénin-Beaumont. 
19 Interview with opposition councillor, Hénin-Beaumont. 
20 Hénin-Beaumont C’est Vous !, May 2015. 
21 Lens Mag, April 2018 
22 Interviews with deputy mayors, Hénin-Beaumont. 
23 Hénin-Beaumont C’est Vous !, April 2018. 
24 Hénin-Beaumont C’est Vous !, December 2016. 
25 Interview with RN deputy mayor, Hénin-Beaumont. 
                                                                                                                                               
26 Interview with opposition councillor. A further notable break with precedent was when the 
RN majority invited local representatives of the Gilets Jaunes protest movement to address a 
council meeting in December 2018. 
